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Necessity as justified truth
Steffen Lewitzka∗
Abstract
We present a logic for the reasoning about necessity and justifications
which is independent from relational semantics. We choose the concept of
justification – coming from a class of Justification Logics (Artemov 2008,
Fitting 2009) – as the primitive notion on which the concept of necessity is
based. Our axiomatization extends Suszko’s non-Fregean logic SCI (Brown,
Suszko 1972) by basic axioms from Justification Logic, axioms for quantifi-
cation over propositions and over justifications, and some further principles.
The core axiom is: ϕ is necessarily true iff there is a justification for ϕ.
That is, necessity is first-order definable by means of justifications. Instead
of defining purely algebraic models in the style of (Brown, Suszko 1972)
we extend the semantics investigated in (Lewitzka 2012) by some algebraic
structure for dealing with justifications and prove soundness and complete-
ness of our deductive system. Moreover, we are able to restore the modal
logic principle of Necessitation if we add the axiom schemaϕ→ ϕ and
a rule of Axiom Necessitation to our system. As a main result, we show that
the modal logics S4 and S5 can be captured by our semantics if we impose
the corresponding modal logic principles as additional semantic constraints.
This will follow from proof-theoretic considerations and from our complete-
ness theorems. For the system S4 we present also a purely model-theoretic
proof.
Keywords: Non-Fregean Logic, Justification Logic, Modal Logic, proposi-
tional self-reference
1 Introduction
In an earlier paper [12] we presented an epistemic non-Fregean logic, called ∈K ,
which is independent of relational semantics and models knowledge and common
knowledge avoiding all forms of the problem of logical omniscience. Formulas
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are interpreted as elements of a given model-theoretic universe M = TRUE ∪
FALSE of true and false propositions.1 Knowledge of an agent i is explicitly
given as a set of true propositions TRUEi ⊆ TRUE ⊂ M . In general, the set
TRUEi is not closed under rules of inference. Nevertheless, imposing specific
constraints on the model-theoretic semantics, it can be closed under logical con-
nectives, Modus Ponens (via a semantic counterpart of axiom K), positive and/or
negative introspection, etc. That is, many standard epistemic principles can be
restored and the reasoning capabilities of an agent may vary from completely ig-
norant to omniscient. The modal logic principle of Necessitation, however, is not
investigated in [12]. A further question arising from [12] is that for an intuitive ex-
planation or justification for knowledge. While (implicit) knowledge in modal epis-
temic logics derives in a rather intuitive way from the underlying possible worlds
scenario (ϕ is known iff ϕ is true in all accessible worlds), knowledge in logic
∈K is given a priori as a set of propositions without any reasons provided by the
semantics. We enrich here the approach developed in [12] by the intuitive (though
abstract) concept of justification coming from a class of Justification Logics which
evolved from the Logic of Proofs introduced by Artemov [1, 2]. The notions of
necessity/knowledge then are based on the primitive concept of justification. In
fact, by introducing quantification over justifications we are able to define neces-
sity/knowledge by means of a first-order existential formula. Justification logics are
classical propositional logics augmented with justification assertions of the form
t : ϕ which read as “t is a justification for ϕ”. In an epistemic framework, such an
assertion reads as “ϕ is known for the explicit reason t”. Under this interpretation,
justification logics can be seen as logics of explicit knowledge addressing the prob-
lem of logical omniscience in a new way. Moreover, justification assertions turn
epistemic logic more expressive and allow for a deeper epistemic analysis. For a
detailed overview we refer the reader to [3, 9, 5]. The standard relational semantics
for Justification Logic was developed by Fitting [8]. In this paper, we apply only a
few basic principles of classical Justification Logic and deviate from some others
(for instance, we will work with a different rule of Axiom Necessitation). The ba-
sic principles that we adopt here are given by the following axiom schemas where
· and + are operations on justification terms:
• s : (ϕ→ ψ)→ (t : ϕ→ (s · t) : ψ) (application)
• s : ϕ→ (s+ t) : ϕ (weakening)
• t : ϕ→ (s+ t) : ϕ (weakening)
1Propositions are in general given as abstract entities. A proposition p, as the element of a model-
theoretic universe, can be identified with the set of all formulas that denote p.
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• (t : ϕ)→ ϕ
We present a Hilbert-style deductive system (with Modus Ponens as the only
rule) which contains the above given axioms and extends Suszko’s basic non-
Fregean logic SCI, the Sentential Calculus with Identity [7], by quantification over
propositions and quantification over justifications (or reasons), a total truth predi-
cate, a connective for propositional reference, and a partial ordering on justifica-
tions. We define a semantics which extends the semantics studied in [14] by some
algebraic machinery for dealing with justifications. This style of non-Fregean se-
mantics goes back to Stra¨ter who designed ∈T -Logic [17] as a first-order logic
for the reasoning about propositional truth and propositional self-reference. ∈T -
Logic does not involve inconsistencies despite of its total truth predicate and its
capability to assert self-referential statements without restrictions. The Tarski bi-
conditionals (Tarski’s T-schema) hold and can be expressed in the object language
(see, e.g., [14, 13] for a discussion). The axiomatization of ∈T -Logic given by
Zeitz [18] can be seen as an extension of the axiomatization of Suszko’s SCI.2 Our
Hilbert-style deductive system extends ∈T -Logic and therefore also SCI. On the
other hand, ∈T -style semantics (which we will apply in this paper) differs essen-
tially from the algebraic semantics given for SCI (see [7]). The algebraic structure
of an ∈T -model is not explicitly given by operations on a propositional universe
but is imposed by the truth conditions and the structural properties of the semantic
assignment function (called Gamma-function) of a model. In [12] it is shown that
(in a quantifier-free setting) ∈T -style semantics is equivalent with the algebraic se-
mantics in the style of Bloom/Suszko. An advantage of ∈T -style semantics is that
models do not carry all the algebraic structure which is already implicitly given by
the Gamma-function and the structure of the object language.
Our logic has all the expressive power of the ∈T -logic presented in [14]. In
particular, we may assert self-referential statements such as truth tellers, liars, con-
tingent liars, etc. but also self-referential epistemic propositions in the object lan-
guage. For instance, the equation d1 ≡ d1 asserts that constant d1 denotes the
proposition “I am necessarily true”. Similarly, d2 ≡ t : d2 asserts that d2 denotes
the proposition “I am true for the explicit reason t”. There exist models satisfying
these equations. Equations such as d3 ≡ (d3 : false) asserting a paradoxical state-
ment can be formulated in the language but they are unsatisfiable. The fact that the
liar proposition does not exist is expressed by the theorem ¬∃x.x ≡ (x : false).
The symbol : in a formula ϕ : true or ϕ : false can be read as “is element of”.
2Roughly speaking, ∈T -Logic = SCI + propositional quantifiers + a total truth predicate. The
connection between ∈T -Logic and SCI remained unnoticed by Stra¨ter and Zeitz. In fact, ∈T -Logic
was developed independently from Suszko’s non-Fregean logics proceeding from different assump-
tions and motivations.
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Thus, ϕ : false reads as “the proposition denoted by ϕ is an element of the set
of false propositions”, or simply: “ϕ is false”. Further properties of propositions
can be expressed in a similar way. In [12] we have expressed knowledge of agents
in this way, and the logic presented in [13] has formulas of the form ϕ : valid
expressing that ϕ belongs to the set of valid formulas.3
Taking into account the axiom (t : ϕ) → ϕ from Justification Logic, together
with the Tarski biconditionals ϕ ↔ (ϕ : true), it follows that a justification
is given by a set of true propositions REASONt ⊆ TRUE. If REASONt
is the set of true propositions assigned to the justification term t, then we put
NECESSARY :=
⋃
t∈Tm(C)REASONt, where Tm(C) is the set of all jus-
tification terms over the set of constant symbols C . NECESSARY is the set of
all propositions which are necessarily true in the model, and this set is the union
of all justifications. That is, the concept of necessity relies on the concept of jus-
tification. In particular, the connection axiom (t : ϕ) → ϕ of logic S4LP [6]
is satisfied. If a justification is a set of propositions, then it seems to be natural
to read the symbol : as “is element of” in the same way as in formulas ϕ : true
or ϕ : false. Therefore, we write ϕ : t instead of t : ϕ.4 ϕ : t reads as “the
proposition denoted by ϕ is an element of the justification denoted by t”. Shorter:
“ϕ belongs to t” or simply “ϕ is t” if we consider a justification t as a property of
propositions. This seems to be in accordance with the ontological view presented
in a recent article of Artemov [4] where justifications are regarded as sets of sen-
tences.5 Justifications can be ordered by inclusion. We express this by formulas
of the form s ≤ t. We deal with propositional quantifiers ∀x, ∃x as in [14]. In
the present paper, we introduce justification quantifiers ∧u (“for all justifications
u ...”) and ∨u (“there is an justification u ...”). To this end, our models have an
additional universe consisting of elements called indexes which are in one-to-one
correspondence with those subsets of the propositional universe which are justifi-
3In order to deal with a global predicate such as validity, the non-Fregean logic developed in [13]
has necessarily the property that an equation ϕ ≡ ψ is true in a model iff it is true in all models. This
implies that we can identify a proposition with the same set of formulas in every model. Hence, it
makes sense to speak of “valid propositions”.
4We hope not to annoy people working in the area of Justification Logic with this change of
notation in this paper. We tried to use a mix of both notations: t : ϕ and ϕ : true which results in
formulas such as t : (ϕ : true). This seems to be not really satisfactory.
5Our interpretation of justifications as sets of true propositions derives directly from the se-
mantic approach presented in [12] (where knowledge is given as a set of true propositions) and
from axioms of basic Justification Logic independently from [4]. Connections between some prop-
erties of our non-Fregean semantics and the notion of modular model given in [4] remain to be
further investigated. We observe here that the inclusions in condition (2) [section 3, [4]] corre-
spond in some sense to the equations of the homomorphism property of our Gamma-function:
Γ (s, γ) ·Λ Γ (t, γ) = Γ (s · t, γ) and Γ (s, γ) +Λ Γ (t, γ) = Γ (s + t, γ), where ·Λ and +Λ are
operations of an algebra Λ of (names of) justifications.
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cations. The justification quantifiers then range over the universe of indexes which
can be seen as (unique) names for justifications. This enables us to formulate our
key axiom: ϕ↔
∨
u.(ϕ : u) which reads as “ϕ is necessarily true iff there exists
a justification for ϕ”. Necessity is a property of propositions which is first-order
definable by means of justifications: consider the term {x | ∨u.(x : u)}, where x
is a propositional variable and u is a variable for justifications.
Finally, we study extensions of our deductive system and of our semantics by
some modal logic principles. We prove that our semantics is strong enough to re-
store the modal logics S4 and S5. These results can be proved independently from
Justification Logic (instead of the axiom of application work with the axiom K of
modal logic). That is, we are able to establish a non-Fregean semantics of a logic
that contains the modal system S4 (or S5).
We refer to the class of logics developed in this paper as ∈J -Logic (Epsilon-
J-Logic). J stands for “justification”, and the symbol ∈ refers to the fact that we
read a formula ϕ : t as “ϕ is element of justification t”.6
2 Syntax
∈J -Logic extends the first-order non-Fregean logic studied in [14], which in turn
is an extension of ∈T -Logic [17, 18]. We have now two sorts of variables. VP =
{x0, x1, ...} is the well-ordered set of propositional variables, VJ = {v0, v1, ...} is
the well-ordered set of justification variables. We refer to propositional variables
as x, y, z, x1, ... and to justification variables as u, v, u1, .... V := VP ∪ VJ is the
set of all variables. C is a set of constant symbols for justifications and D is a set of
constant symbols for propositions. All these sets are pairwise disjoint. If there is no
risk of confusion we may refer to the elements of V ∪C ∪D as x, y, x1, ... without
distinction of the actual sort of the element. The existential quantifiers ∃x and
∨
u
are definable by means of the universal quantifiers in the usual way. We use ♦ϕ as
an abbreviation for the formula ¬¬ϕ. Besides propositional identity expressed
by the identity connective ≡ coming from basic non-Fregean logic we have an
additional identity for justifications for which we use the same symbol: s ≡ t
reads as “the justification terms s and t denote the same justification”. We have
a connective < for propositional reference introduced and studied in [10, 11, 14].
ϕ < ψ reads as “the proposition denoted by ψ says something about (refers to)
the proposition denoted by ϕ”. We introduce a relation symbol ≤ for a partial
ordering on justifications. The formula s ≤ t reads as “justification s is contained
6This harmonizes with the names for ∈T -Logic [18, 17, 14] (T stands for classical truth), ∈I -
Logic [11, 13] (I stands for intuitionistic truth) and ∈K -Logic [12] (K stands for knowledge).
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in justification t” or “justification s is stronger than justification t”. The predicates
for truth and falsity come from ∈T -Logic [17] and are already discussed in the
introductory section.7
Definition 2.1 Let C,D be disjoint sets of constant symbols.
• The set of justification terms Tm(C) is the smallest set that contains VJ ∪C
and is closed under the following condition. If s, t ∈ Fm(C), then (s ·
t), (s+ t) ∈ Tm(C).
• The set of formulas Fm(C,D) is the smallest set that contains VP ∪D and is
closed under the following condition. If ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm(C,D), s, t ∈ Tm(C),
x ∈ VP and u ∈ VJ , then (ϕ → ψ), (¬ϕ), (ϕ ≡ ψ), (ϕ < ψ), (s ≡ t),
(s ≤ t), (ϕ : true), (ϕ : false), (ϕ), (ϕ : t), (∀x.ϕ), (
∧
u.ϕ) are
formulas.
Let ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D). Notions such as subformula of ϕ and free variables of
ϕ are defined in the usual way. ψ is a proper subformula of ϕ if ψ is a subfor-
mula of ϕ and ψ 6= ϕ. We denote the set of all free propositional variables of ϕ
by fvarP (ϕ), the set of all free justification variables of ϕ by fvarJ(ϕ). We put
fvar(ϕ) := fvarP (ϕ) ∪ fvarJ(ϕ). conP (ϕ), conJ(ϕ) is the set of all propo-
sitional constants, of all justification constants, occurring in ϕ, respectively. By
fcon(ϕ) we denote the set of all free variables and all constant symbols occurring
in ϕ. If t ∈ Tm(C), then var(t), con(t), is the set of variables, constant symbols
occurring in ϕ, respectively. We put varcon(t) := var(t) ∪ con(t).
According to Definition 2.1, if ϕ is a formula with x, u /∈ fvar(ϕ), then also
∀x.ϕ and
∧
u.ϕ are formulas, for example, ∀x.d, ∀x.(y → z),
∧
u.(v ≤ v). Such
formulas do not express meaningful propositions and are therefore undesired. Let
us call a formula ϕ proper if it has the following property: if ψ is a subformula of
ϕ of the form ∀x.ψ′ or
∧
u.ψ′, then x ∈ fvarP (ψ′), u ∈ fvarJ(ψ′), respectively.
It is possible to modify and to extend Definition 2.1 in such a way that Fm(C,D)
contains exactly the proper formulas (see [14]). So we will assume in the following
that Fm(C,D) is the set of all proper formulas. That is, if we consider formulas
∀x.ϕ or
∧
u.ψ, then we always assume that x ∈ fvarP (ϕ), u ∈ fvarJ(ψ). Given
the notion of free variables, it is clear that the set of proper formulas can be defined
inductively and we therefore may carry out proofs by induction on the construction
of (proper) formulas.
7Note that from a strict semantic point of view : true is not a predicate but rather a predicate
symbol which is interpreted in every model by the truth predicate TRUE – the set of true proposi-
tions of the model-theoretic universe. However, in the sense of Tarski’s truth theory, where sentences
(instead of propositions) are considered as the bearers of truth values, : true can be seen as the truth
predicate of the object language.
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Definition 2.2 A substitution is a function σ : VP ∪VJ ∪C∪D → Form(C,D)∪
Tm(C) with the property
• σ(x) ∈ Form(C,D) whenever x ∈ VP ∪D
• σ(x) ∈ Tm(C) whenever x ∈ VJ ∪ C
If A ⊆ VP ∪ VJ ∪ C ∪ D and σ is a substitution such that σ(x) = x for all
x ∈ (VP∪VJ∪C∪D)rA, then we write σ : A→ Form(C,D)∪Tm(C). If σ is a
substitution, x0, ..., xn ∈ VP ∪VJ∪C∪D and e0, ..., en ∈ Form(C,D)∪Tm(C)
such that xi is a formula iff ei is a formula (equivalently: xi is a term iff ei is a
term), then σ[x0 := e0, ..., xn := en] is the substitution τ defined as follows:
τ(z) =
{
ei if z = xi, for some i ≤ n
σ(z) else.
The identity substitution x 7→ x is denoted by ε. Instead of ε[x0 := e0, ..., xn :=
en] we write [x0 := e0, ..., xn := en]. A substitution σ extends in the canonical
way to a function [σ] : Fm(C,D) ∪ Tm(C) → Fm(C,D) ∪ Tm(C) (we use
postfix notation for [σ]):
x[σ] = σ(x), if x ∈ VP ∪ VJ ∪ C ∪D
(s · t)[σ] = (s[σ] · t[σ])
(s+ t)[σ] = (s[σ] + t[σ])
(ϕ→ ψ)[σ] = ϕ[σ]→ ψ[σ]
(¬ϕ)[σ] = ¬ϕ[σ]
(ϕ : true)[σ] = ϕ[σ] : true
(ϕ : false)[σ] = ϕ[σ] : false
(ϕ : t)[σ] = ϕ[σ] : t[σ]
(ϕ)[σ] = ϕ[σ]
(s ≡ t)[σ] = s[σ] ≡ t[σ]
(s ≤ t)[σ] = s[σ] ≤ t[σ]
(ϕ ≡ ψ)[σ] = ϕ[σ] ≡ ψ[σ]
(ϕ < ψ)[σ] = ϕ[σ] < ψ[σ]
(
∧
u.ϕ)[σ] =
∧
v.ϕ[σ[u := v]]
(∀x.ϕ)[σ] = ∀y.ϕ[σ[x := y]],
where v is the least variable of VJ greater than all elements of
⋃
{fvarJ(σ(w)) |
w ∈ fcon(
∧
u.ϕ)}, and y is the least variable of VP greater than all elements of
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⋃
{fvarP (σ(w)) | w ∈ fcon(
∧
u.ϕ)}. We say that the variable v (the variable
y) is forced by the substitution σ w.r.t. ∨u.ϕ (w.r.t. ∀x.ϕ).
The composition of two substitutions σ and τ is the substitution σ ◦ τ defined
by x 7→ σ(z)[τ ]. The following Lemma collects some useful properties of substi-
tutions.
Lemma 2.3 (Properties of substitutions) Let ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D), t ∈ Tm(C), and
let σ, τ, ̺ be substitutions. Then
• fcon(ϕ[σ]) =
⋃
{fcon(σ(y)) | y ∈ fcon(ϕ)} and
varcon(t[σ]) =
⋃
{varcon(σ(y)) | y ∈ varcon(t)}
• If σ(x) = τ(x) for all x ∈ fcon(ϕ) ∩ varcon(t), then ϕ[σ] = ϕ[τ ] and
t[σ] = t[τ ]
• The variable y ∈ VP forced by σ w.r.t. ∀x.ψ is the least element of VP
greater than all elements of fvarP ((∃x.ψ)[σ])
• The variable v ∈ VJ forced by σ w.r.t.
∧
u.ψ is the least element of VJ
greater than all elements of fvarJ((
∧
u.ψ)[σ])
• ϕ[σ ◦ τ ] = ϕ[σ][τ ] and t[σ ◦ τ ] = t[σ][τ ]
• σ ◦ (τ ◦ δ) = (σ ◦ τ) ◦ δ
Definition 2.4 The alpha-congruence =α is the smallest equivalence relation on
Form(C,D) satisfying the following conditions.
• ϕ1 =α ψ1 and ϕ2 =α ψ2 implies ϕ1 ∗ϕ2 =α ψ1 ∗ψ2, where ∗ ∈ {→,≡, <}
• ϕ =α ψ implies ϕ : true =α ψ : true, ϕ : false =α ψ : false, ϕ : t =α
ψ : t, ¬ϕ =α ¬ψ, ϕ =α ψ
• If ∧u.ϕ and ∧ v.ψ are formulas8 such that ϕ =α ψ[v := u], and v 6= u
implies u /∈ fvarJ(ψ), then
∧
u.ϕ =α
∧
v.ψ.
• If ∀x.ϕ and ∀y.ψ are formulas such that ϕ =α ψ[y := x], and y 6= x implies
x /∈ fvar(ψ), then ∀x.ϕ =α ∀y.ψ.
8Recall that we mean proper formulas, i.e. u ∈ fvarJ(ϕ) and v ∈ fvar(ψ).
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Two formulas are alpha-congruent iff they differ at most on their bound vari-
ables. Applying the identity substitution ε to a formula ϕ results in general in a
renaming of bound variables. ϕ[ε] is in a certain normal form, we say that it is
normalized. It holds that ϕ[ε] =α ϕ, and furthermore ϕ =α ψ iff ϕ[ε] = ψ[ε] (see
[14] for proofs and more details). Our definition of semantics will ensure that two
alpha-congruent formulas always denote the same proposition. From [10, 14] we
adopt a further syntactical relation ≺ on the set of formulas. ϕ ≺ ψ will capture
the intuitive notion of “formula ψ says something about formula ϕ” or “formula ψ
refers to formula ϕ”.
Definition 2.5 Let ϕ,ψ ∈ Fm(C,D). Then ϕ ≺ ψ :⇔ there are x ∈ VP and
ψ′ ∈ Fm(C,D) r {x} such that x ∈ fvarP (ψ′) and ψ′[x := ϕ] =α ψ. The
relation ≺ is called syntactical reference.
ϕ ≺ ψ implies that ϕ is alpha-congruent to a proper subformula of ψ. In a
quantifier-free language the converse would be true, too. However, x ⊀ ∀x.(x →
d), whereas x ≺ (x → d). In the latter case, the formula x → d says something
about formula x, namely that formula x implies formula d. In the former case,
however, the formula ∀x.(x→ d) does not say anything about the formula x.
A syntactical reference ϕ ≺ ψ can never be a self-reference since no formula
is a proper subformula of itself: ϕ ≺ ϕ is impossible. There are no self-referential
formulas. Self-reference must be shifted to the semantic level where it is repre-
sented by the semantic reference relation <M on the propositional universe of a
model M. Our model definition ensures that syntactical reference ϕ ≺ ψ implies
semantic reference between the respectively denoted propositions. This can be ex-
pressed by ϕ < ψ. If ϕ ≺ ψ and the formula ϕ ≡ ψ is true in a given model,
then the formula ϕ < ϕ is also true in the model. Thus, ϕ denotes a self-referential
proposition. A typical example is the equation d ≡ (d : true) asserting a truth
teller. Constructions of models that contain specific self-referential propositions
are developed in [11, 12]. For these constructions, however, we worked with a
quantifier-free language. Constructions of infinite standard models for a first-order
language are difficult because of the impredicativity of quantifiers (see [14]). A
standard model M is a model where every proposition is denoted by a sentence
(i.e., there are no non-standard elements) and for any two formulas ϕ,ψ and any
assignment γ, (M, γ)  ϕ < ψ implies the existence of formulas ϕ′ and ψ′ such
that ϕ′ ≺ ψ′ and (M, γ)  (ϕ′ ≡ ϕ)∧(ψ′ ≡ ψ), in particular (M, γ)  (ϕ′ < ψ′)
(see [14]). Standard models are the intended models. All models constructed in this
article are standard models. The existence of non-standard models is the prize that
we have to pay for the existence of a complete calculus. In [14] we constructed
a canonical model M, i.e. a model without non-standard elements and with the
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following property: M  ϕ < ψ ⇔ ϕ ≺ ψ. A canonical model is a standard
model which satisfies only the trivial equations between sentences, i.e. equations
between alpha-congruent sentences. One can modify the construction given in [14]
in such a way that the resulting standard model satisfies specific non-trivial equa-
tions. In this way, one gets standard models that contain specific self-referential
propositions.
We skip the proofs of the following useful facts.
Lemma 2.6 If ϕ ≺ ψ and σ is a substitution, then ϕ[σ] ≺ ψ[σ].
Lemma 2.7 The syntactical reference ≺ is a transitive relation on Fm(C,D).
Before we present our set of axioms we introduce the following notation. Let
ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D), t ∈ Tm(C), let σ, σ′ : V → Fm(C,D) ∪ Tm(C) be substitu-
tions, and suppose fvar(ϕ) = {x1, ..., xn} and var(t) = {u1, ..., um}. Then we
abbreviate the formula (σ(x1) ≡ σ′(x1))∧ ...∧ (σ(xn) ≡ σ′(xn)) by the notation
σ ≡ϕ σ
′ which can be informally read as “σ and σ′ coincide on all free variables of
ϕ”. Similarly, we write σ ≡t σ′ for the formula (σ(u1) ≡ σ′(u1))∧ ...∧(σ(um) ≡
σ′(um)).
9 Note that var(t) contains only justification variables whereas fvar(ϕ)
can contain justification variables as well as propositional variables.
Definition 2.8 The set Ax of axioms is the smallest set containing a sufficient set
of tautologies of classical propositional logic, all formulas of the form given in (i)
– (xxiii) below, and being closed under the following two conditions:
• If ϕ ∈ Ax and u ∈ fvarJ(ϕ), then
∧
u.ϕ ∈ Ax.
• If ϕ ∈ Ax and x ∈ fvarP (ϕ), then ∀x.ϕ ∈ Ax.
(i) ϕ : true↔ ϕ (Tarski biconditionals)
(ii) ϕ : false↔ ¬ϕ
(iii) (ϕ→ ψ) : s→ (ϕ : t→ ψ : (s · t)) (application)
(iv) ϕ : s→ ϕ : (s+ t) (weakening)
(v) ϕ : t→ ϕ : (s+ t) (weakening)
(vi) ϕ↔ ∨u.(ϕ : u), if u ∈ VJ r fvarJ(ϕ) (necessity as justified truth)
(vii) ϕ→ ϕ
9We consider the underlying orderings on VP and on VJ .
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(viii) ϕ < ψ, whenever ϕ ≺ ψ (syntactical reference implies semantical refer-
ence)
(ix) (ϕ < ψ)→ ((ψ < χ)→ (ϕ < χ)) (semantical reference is transitive)
(x) ϕ ≡ ψ, whenever ϕ =α ψ (alpha-congruent expressions have the same
denotation)
(xi) (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
(xii) (σ ≡ϕ σ′)→ (ϕ[σ] ≡ ϕ[σ′]) (Substitution Principle 1)
(xiii) ϕ[u := t]→ ∨u.ϕ
(xiv) ∧u.ϕ→ ϕ[u := t]
(xv) ∧u.(ψ → ϕ)→ (∧ u.ψ → ∧u.ϕ)
(xvi) ∧u.(ψ → ϕ)→ (ψ → ∧u.ϕ), if u /∈ fvarJ(ψ)
(xvii) ϕ[x := ψ]→ ∃x.ϕ
(xviii) ∀x.ϕ→ ϕ[x := ψ]
(xix) ∀x.(ψ → ϕ)→ (∀x.ψ → ∀x.ϕ)
(xx) ∀x.(ψ → ϕ)→ (ψ → ∀x.ϕ), if x /∈ fvarP (ψ)
(xxi) (s ≤ t)↔ ∀x.(x : s→ x : t)
(xxii) (s ≡ t) ↔ (s ≤ t) ∧ (t ≤ s) (Extensionality: a justification is determined
by its elements)
(xxiii) (σ ≡t σ′)→ (t[σ] ≡ t[σ′]) (Substitution Principle 2).
Definition 2.9 If Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D), then Φ⊢ is the smallest set of formulas contain-
ing Φ∪Ax and being closed under the rule of Modus Ponens: If ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ⊢ and
ϕ ∈ Φ⊢, then ψ ∈ Φ⊢.
If ϕ ∈ Φ⊢, then we write Φ ⊢ ϕ. The notions of derivation, consistent set, incon-
sistent set, maximally consistent set are defined in the usual way.
Notice that the axioms (xiii) and (xvii) derive from (xiv) and (xviii) together
with propositional logic. The system Ax is rather weak. No formula of the form
ϕ : t or ϕ is a theorem. This will change when we add the rule of Axiom Neces-
sitation in section 5. We will show that adding this rule together with the schema
ϕ→ ϕ will imply the modal logic principle of Necessitation (Theorem 5.5).
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It is not hard to check that our deductive system extends Suszko’s basic non-
Fregean logic SCI, the Sentential Calculus with Identity, (see, e.g., [7]). For in-
stance, the axiom (ϕ ≡ ψ) → (¬ϕ ≡ ¬ψ) of SCI can be obtained as follows:
Let σ = [x := ϕ], σ′ = [x := ψ] be substitutions and let χ be the formula ¬x.
Obviously, (σ ≡χ σ′) → (χ[σ] ≡ χ[σ′]) is an instance of (xii), i.e. an element of
Ax. But this notation is an abbreviation of the formula (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (¬ϕ ≡ ¬ψ).
Our deductive system differs in some essential aspects from the axiomatization
of (the weaker) first-order ∈T -Logic presented in [18]. For instance, we deal with
substitutions in a different way and – inspired by the Hilbert-style calculus for
classical first-order logic given in [16] – we work without a Generalization Rule.
3 Semantics
Our notion of model extends the definition presented in [14]. Instead of defin-
ing algebraic models in the style of Bloom/Suszko [7] we prefer to work with an
(equivalent) ∈T -style semantics which in its essence goes back to Stra¨ter [17] and
Zeitz [18]. We add some algebraic structure in order to deal with justifications.
Definition 3.1 A model
M = (Λ,M, TRUE,NECESSARY, (REASONl)l∈L, FALSE,<
M, Γ )
is given by the following:
• Λ = (L,+Λ, ·Λ,≤Λ) is an algebraic structure with two binary operations
+Λ, ·Λ and a partial ordering ≤Λ on L. The elements of L are called indexes
or justification names.
• M , TRUE, FALSE, NECESSARY , REASONl, for each l ∈ L, are
sets of propositions such that the following conditions are satisfied:
– M = TRUE ∪ FALSE is the propositional universe
– TRUE ∩ FALSE = ∅
– NECESSARY ⊆ TRUE
– NECESSARY =
⋃
l∈LREASONl
– (L,≤Λ) is order-isomorphic to ((REASONl)l∈L,⊆)
• <M⊆M ×M is a transitive relation, called the reference relation of M.
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• Γ : (Fm(C,D)∪Tm(C))×(M∪L)V →M is a semantic function, the so-
called Gamma-function, that maps a formula ϕ to a proposition Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈
M , and a justification term s to an index Γ (s, γ) ∈ L. Γ depends on assign-
ments γ : V →M ∪L. If γ is an assignment, x ∈ VP and m ∈M , then γmx
is the assignment that maps x to m and variables y ∈ V r {x} to γ(y). The
assignment γlu, where u ∈ VJ and l ∈ L, is defined similarly.
The Gamma-function satisfies the following structure conditions:
• For all x ∈ V = VP∪VJ and all assignments γ: Γ (x, γ) = γ(x). (Extension
Property (EP))
• If γ(x) = γ′(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ) and γ(u) = γ′(u) for all u ∈ varJ(s),
then Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ϕ, γ′) and Γ (s, γ) = Γ (s, γ′). (Coincidence Property
(CP))10
• If σ : V → Fm(C,D) ∪ Tm(C) is a substitution and γ : V → M ∪ L
an assignment, then Γ (ϕ[σ], γ) = Γ (ϕ, γσ) and Γ (s[σ], γ) = Γ (s, γσ),
where γσ : V → Fm(C,D) ∪ Tm(C) is the substitution defined by x 7→
Γ (σ(x), γ) for x ∈ V = VP ∪ VJ . (Substitution Property (SP))
• ϕ ≺ ψ implies Γ (ϕ, γ) <M Γ (ψ, γ), for all assignments γ : V → M ∪ L.
(Reference Property (RP))
• Γ (s + t, γ) = Γ (s, γ) +Λ Γ (t, γ) and Γ (s · t, γ) = Γ (s, γ) ·Λ Γ (t, γ), for
all assignments γ ∈ (M ∪ L)V . (Homomorphism Property (HP))
The Gamma-function satisfies the following truth conditions. For all assignments
γ : V →M ∪ L, for all formulas ϕ,ψ, and for all justification terms s, t:
(i) Γ (ϕ→ ψ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ FALSE or Γ (ψ, γ) ∈ TRUE
(ii) Γ (¬ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) /∈ TRUE
(iii) Γ (ϕ : true, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE
(iv) Γ (ϕ : false, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ FALSE
(v) Γ (ϕ ≡ ψ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ψ, γ)
(vi) Γ (ϕ < ψ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) <M Γ (ψ, γ)
(vii) Γ (s ≡ t, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (s, γ) = Γ (t, γ)
10If fvar(ϕ) = ∅, then (CP) justifies to write Γ (ϕ) instead of Γ (ϕ, γ).
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(viii) Γ (s ≤ t, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (s, γ) ≤Λ Γ (t, γ)
(ix) Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ NECESSARY
(x) Γ (ϕ : t, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (t,γ)
(xi) Γ (ϕ → ψ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s,γ) and Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (t,γ) implies
Γ (ψ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s·t,γ)
(xii) Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s,γ) ∪REASONΓ (t,γ) implies
Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s+t,γ)
(xiii) Γ (∧u.ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γlu) ∈ TRUE for all l ∈ L
(xiv) Γ (∀x.ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (ϕ, γmx ) ∈ TRUE for all m ∈M
If M is a model and γ : V → M ∪ L is an assignment, then the tuple (M, γ) is
called an interpretation.
Definition 3.2 Let (M, γ) be an interpretation. The satisfaction relation is defined
by (M, γ)  ϕ :⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE, for ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D). If Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D),
then (M, γ)  Φ :⇔ (M, γ)  ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Φ. An interpretation that
satisfies a formula (a set of formulas) is called a model of that formula (of that set
of formulas). The class of all interpretations that satisfy a set Φ is Mod(Φ) :=
{(M, γ)  Φ | M is a model and γ is an assignment of M}. The relation of
logical consequence is defined as follows: Φ  ϕ :⇔Mod(Φ) ⊆Mod({ϕ}).
Let M be a model and γ be an assignment. The set
FN := {ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) | Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ NECESSARY }
is closed under Modus Ponens (because of truth condition (xi), see the proof of
Theorem 5.8) but in general it does not contain the axioms of Ax. So it is in gen-
eral not closed under logical consequence. This will change when we introduce the
rule (and the corresponding truth condition) of Axiom Necessitation ensuring that
FN contains all axioms of Ax.
The structure conditions of a model guarantee the following Substitution Prin-
ciples.
Lemma 3.3 (Substitution Principles 1 and 2) Let σ, σ′ : V → Fm(C,D) ∪
Tm(C) be substitutions and let ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) and t ∈ Tm(C). Then
•  (σ ≡ϕ σ
′)→ (ϕ[σ] ≡ ϕ[σ′])
•  (σ ≡t σ
′)→ (t[σ] ≡ t[σ′])
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Proof. Suppose (M, γ) is a model of σ ≡ϕ σ′. This means that Γ (σ(x), γ) =
Γ (σ′(x), γ), for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). By (SP) and (EP), γσ(x) = Γ (x, γσ) =
Γ (x, γσ′) = γσ′(x), for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Then (CP) and (SP) yield Γ (ϕ[σ], γ) =
Γ (ϕ, γσ) = Γ (ϕ, γσ′) = Γ (ϕ[σ′], γ). That is, (M, γ)  ϕ[σ] ≡ ϕ[σ′]. The
second Substitution Principle follows similarly. 
It is now straightforward to show that all axioms are valid.
Stronger than Substitution Principle 1 is item (i) of the following Substitution
Lemma. Several versions of this Lemma were already proved in [18, 17]. The
proof given in [Lemma 3.14, [11]] relies on ideas due to Zeitz [18] and can easily
be adapted to ∈J -Logic.
Lemma 3.4 (Substitution Lemma) Let M be a model, ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D).
(i) If σ, σ′ are substitutions and γ, γ′ : V → M ∪ L are assignments such
that Γ (σ(z), γ) = Γ (σ′(z), γ′) for all z ∈ fcon(ϕ), then Γ (ϕ[σ], γ) =
Γ (ϕ[σ′], γ′).
(ii) If γ : V → M ∪ L is an assignment and σ is a substitution such that
Γ (e) = Γ (σ(e), γ) for every e ∈ C ∪D, then Γ (ϕ[σ], γ) = Γ (ϕ, γσ).
Item (ii) provides a condition such that the (SP) also holds for certain substi-
tutions which are not necessarily restricted to the domain of variables. Item (i)
implies a third Substitution Principle which we will apply to show that the follow-
ing sets are well defined. Let M be a model. We define:
POSSIBLE := {Γ (ϕ, γ) | Γ (¬ϕ, γ) /∈ NECESSARY, for some ϕ, γ}
IMPOSSIBLE := {Γ (ϕ, γ) | Γ (¬ϕ, γ) ∈ NECESSARY, for some ϕ, γ}
Suppose β is an assignment and ψ is a formula such that Γ (ψ, β) = p ∈
POSSIBLE. By definition of POSSIBLE, there is a formula ϕ and an as-
signment γ such that Γ (ϕ, γ) = p and Γ (¬ϕ, γ) /∈ NECESSARY . We de-
fine two substitutions σ = [x := ϕ] and σ′ = [x := ψ]. Then Γ (σ(x), γ) =
Γ (ϕ, γ) = p = Γ (ψ, β) = Γ (σ′(x), β). Item (i) of the Substitution Lemma yields
Γ (¬ϕ, γ) = Γ ((¬x)[σ], γ) = Γ ((¬x)[σ′]), β) = Γ (¬ψ, β). Thus, Γ (¬ψ, γ) /∈
NECESSARY . Hence, POSSIBLE is well defined. Similarly, one shows that
IMPOSSIBLE is well defined.
The next fact follows readily from the definitions.
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Lemma 3.5 Let M be a model. For any ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) and any assignment
γ : V → Fm(C,D) ∪ Tm(C):
• Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ POSSIBLE ⇔ Γ (¬¬ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (♦ϕ, γ) ∈
TRUE
• Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ IMPOSSIBLE ⇔ Γ (¬ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ Γ (¬♦ϕ, γ) ∈
TRUE
Note that the set FALSE is definable, too: FALSE = {Γ (ϕ, γ) | Γ (¬ϕ, γ) ∈
TRUE, for some ϕ, γ}. In fact, formulas of the form ϕ : false and ¬ϕ are log-
ically equivalent and we could do without the operator : false. However, in this
intensional setting ¬ϕ and ϕ : false express different intensions and denote in
general different propositions.
As already pointed out above, we expect that any two alpha-congruent formulas
denote the same proposition. This is actually the case as the following Lemma
shows. We adopt the proof from [14].
Lemma 3.6 (Alpha Property (αP )) Let M be a model. For all formulas ϕ,ψ
and all assignments γ : V →M , if ϕ =α ψ, then Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ψ, γ).
Proof. Suppose ϕ =α ψ. Recall that this is equivalent with the condition ϕ[ε] =
ψ[ε], where ε is the identity substitution (see [14]). It holds that γ = γε, for any
assignment γ : V →M ∪L. By (SP) ofM: Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ϕ, γε) = Γ (ϕ[ε], γ) =
Γ (ψ[ε], γ) = Γ (ψ, γε) = Γ (ψ, γ). 
4 The Completeness Theorem
In order to prove that our deductive system is complete with respect to the defined
semantics we follow the usual strategy. We define a suitable notion of Henkin set,
show that every Henkin set has a model, and finally show that every consistent
set extends to a Henkin set. Of course, this establishes in particular soundness
of a certain subset of Ax with respect to the semantics of the particular (and less
expressive) ∈T -logic presented in [14].
Lemma 4.1 Let ϕ ∈ Ax. If c ∈ C and w ∈ VJ r var(ϕ), then ϕ[c := w] ∈ Ax.
Similarly, if d ∈ C and y ∈ VP r var(ϕ), then ϕ[d := y] ∈ Ax.
16
Proof. Consider, for instance, the axiom
∧
u.ϕ → ϕ[u := t] of schema (xiv).
We have
(
∧
u.ϕ→ ϕ[u := t])[c := w]
= (
∧
u.ϕ)[c := w]→ (ϕ[u := t])[c := w]
=
∧
v.ϕ[c := w, u := v]→ ϕ[c := w][u := t′]
=
∧
v.ϕ[c := w][u := v]→ (ϕ[c := w][u := v])[v := t′]
=
∧
v.ψ → ψ[v := t′],
where v is the variable forced by [c := w] w.r.t.
∧
u.ϕ → ϕ[u := t], t′ = t[c :=
w], and ψ := ϕ[c := w][u := v]. The last formula is clearly an axiom of the
form (xiv). Note that w 6= u since w /∈ var(ϕ). The same argument can also be
applied in the other cases that involve quantifiers. The quantifier-free cases follow
straightforwardly. 
Lemma 4.2 If Φ ⊢ ϕ and c ∈ conJ(ϕ)rconJ (Φ), then for any u ∈ VJrvar(ϕ),
Φ ⊢
∧
u.(ϕ[c := u]). Similarly, if Φ ⊢ ϕ and d ∈ conP (ϕ) r conP (Φ), then for
any x ∈ VP r var(ϕ), Φ ⊢ ∀x.(ϕ[d := x]).
Proof. The proof is an induction on the length n ≥ 1 of a derivation Φ ⊢ ϕ.
If n = 1, then ϕ must be an axiom (note that ϕ ∈ Φ is impossible because
c ∈ con(ϕ) does not occur in Φ). By Lemma 4.1, ϕ[c := u] is an axiom, too.
Thus,
∧
u.(ϕ[c := u]) is an axiom. Now suppose n > 1. We may assume that ϕ is
obtained by Modus Ponens, that is, Φ ⊢ ψ → ϕ and Φ ⊢ ψ, for some formula ψ. If
c /∈ conJ(ψ), then ψ → ϕ[c := u] = (ψ → ϕ)[c := u], where u ∈ VJ r var(ψ).
By the induction hypothesis, Φ ⊢
∧
u.(ψ → ϕ[c := u]). By axiom (xvi),
Φ ⊢ ψ →
∧
u.(ϕ[c := u]). Now we apply Modus Ponens. If c ∈ conJ(ψ),
then we may apply the induction hypothesis to Φ ⊢ ψ and to Φ ⊢ ψ → ϕ, and ob-
tain Φ ⊢
∧
u.(ψ[c := u]) and Φ ⊢
∧
u.(ψ[c := u]→ ϕ[c := u]). Axiom (xv) and
Modus Ponens now yield the assertion. The second assertion follows analogously.

In our treatment of Henkin set (Definitions 4.3 and 4.4, and Lemma 4.5 below)
we follow some notation and techniques given in W. Rautenberg’s logic book [16].
Definition 4.3 A set Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D) is called a Henkin set if
• Φ is maximally consistent
17
• Φ ⊢
∧
u.ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢ ϕ[u := c] for all c ∈ C
• Φ ⊢ ∀x.ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢ ϕ[x := d] for all d ∈ D
Definition 4.4 Suppose we are given the language Fm(C,D).
• To each pair ϕ, u, where ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) and u ∈ fvarJ(ϕ), we assign
exactly one new justification constant cϕ,u /∈ C and define ϕu := ¬
∧
u.ϕ∧
ϕ[u := cϕ,u]. Furthermore, X(C,D) := {¬(ϕu) | ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D), u ∈
fvarJ(ϕ)}.
• To each pair ϕ, x, where ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) and x ∈ fvarP (ϕ), we assign
exactly one new propositional constant dϕ,x /∈ D and define ϕx := ¬∀x.ϕ∧
ϕ[x := dϕ,x]. Furthermore, Y (C,D) := {¬(ϕx) | ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D), x ∈
fvarP (ϕ)}.
Note that ¬(ϕu) can be written as
∨
u.¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ[u := cϕ,u]. In this sense, the
new constant symbol cϕ,u is a witness for the truth of
∨
u.¬ϕ. Similarly, cϕ,x can
be seen as a witness for the truth of ∃x.¬ϕ.
Lemma 4.5 If Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D) is consistent, then Φ ∪ X(C,D) ⊆ Fm(C ′,D)
and Φ ∪ Y (C,D) ⊆ Fm(C,D′) are consistent, too, where C ′, D′ are the sets C ,
D enriched by the new constant symbols, respectively.
Proof. Suppose Φ∪X(C,D) ⊆ Fm(C ′,D) is inconsistent. There are formulas
¬(ϕu00 ), ...,¬(ϕ
un
n ) ∈ X(C,D) such that Φ ∪ {¬(ϕ
ui
i ) | i ≤ n} is inconsistent.
We may assume that n is minimal with this property. Let u := un, ϕ := ϕn,
c := cn,ϕ, Φ
′ := Φ ∪ {¬(ϕuii ) | i < n}. Then Φ′ is consistent and Φ′ ∪ {¬(ϕu)}
is inconsistent. From classical propositional logic it follows that Φ′ ⊢ ϕu. That
is, Φ′ ⊢ ¬
∧
u.ϕ ∧ ϕ[u := c], thus Φ′ ⊢ ¬
∧
u.ϕ and Φ′ ⊢ ϕ[u := c]. By
construction, c ∈ conJ(ϕ) r conJ(Φ′) and, of course, u /∈ varJ (ϕ[u := c]).
Then we can apply Lemma 4.2 and get Φ′ ⊢
∧
u.ϕ and Φ′ ⊢ ¬
∧
u.ϕ. It follows
that Φ′ is inconsistent. This contradiction shows that Φ ∪X(C,D) ⊆ Fm(C ′,D)
is consistent. In a similar way, one shows the consistency of Φ ∪ Y (C,D) ⊆
Fm(C,D′). 
Definition 4.6 Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D) be a maximally consistent set. For ϕ,ψ ∈
Fm(C,D) and s, t ∈ Tm(C) define
• ϕ ≈F ψ :⇔ Φ ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ,
• s ≈T t :⇔ Φ ⊢ s ≡ t.
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Of course, these equivalence relations rely on the given set Φ. It will be clear
from the context on which maximally consistent set these relations are based.
Lemma 4.7 If Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D) is maximally consistent, then:
(i) ≈T is an equivalence relation on Tm(C).
(ii) ≈F is an equivalence relation on Fm(C,D), containing alpha-congruence.
(iii) If ϕ ≈F ϕ′ and ψ ≈F ψ′ and s ∈ Tm(C), then
ϕ ≈F ϕ
′
ϕ : s ≈F ϕ
′ : s
ϕ < ψ ≈F ϕ
′ < ψ′.
(iv) If s ≈T s′ and t ≈T t′ and ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D), then
ϕ : s ≈F ϕ : s
′
s ≤ t ≈F s
′ ≤ t′
s+ t ≈T s
′ + t′
s · t ≈T s
′ · t′.
(v) If ϕ ≈F ψ, then ϕ ∈ Φ⇔ ψ ∈ Φ.
Proof. (i): By Lemma 4.2, ⊢ (d : s) → (d : s) implies ⊢ ∀x.(x : s → x : s),
where s is a justification term and d is any propositional constant. It follows that
Φ ⊢ ∀x.(x : s → x : s), thus s ≈T s and ≈T is reflexive. Suppose s1 ≈T s2
and s2 ≈T s3. Then Φ ⊢ ∀x.(x : s1 → x : s2) and Φ ⊢ ∀x.(x : s2 → x : s3).
Working with axiom (xix) and axioms of classical propositional logic we get Φ ⊢
∀x.(x : s1) → ∀x.(x : s3) and thus Φ ⊢ ∀x.(x : s1 → x : s3). Similarly, we
obtain Φ ⊢ ∀x.(x : s3 → x : s1). That is, s1 ≈T s3 and ≈T is transitive. One
easily shows that ≈T is also symmetric.
(ii): From axiom (x) it follows that ≈F is reflexive and contains alpha-congruence.
Suppose ϕ ≈F ψ and let χ := (x ≈F ϕ), where x /∈ varP (ϕ). Then χ[x :=
ϕ] ≈F χ[x := ψ], by axiom (xii). Since Φ ⊢ χ[x := ϕ], axiom (xi) yields
Φ ⊢ χ[:= ψ]. Thus, ψ ≈F ϕ and ≈F is symmetric. Now suppose ϕ1 ≈F ϕ2
and ϕ2 ≈F ϕ3. Let χ := (x ≡ ϕ3), with x /∈ varP (ϕ3). By axiom (xii),
χ[x := ϕ1] ≈F χ[x := ϕ2]. By hypothesis, Φ ⊢ χ[x := ϕ2]. Symmetry of ≈F ,
axiom (xi) and Modus Pones yield Φ ⊢ χ[x := ϕ1]. That is, ϕ1 ≈F ϕ3 and ≈F is
transitive.
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(iii): By axiom (x), x ≈F x, for any x ∈ VP . By axiom (xii), ϕ = (x)[x :=
ϕ ≈ (x)[x := ϕ′] = ϕ′. The second assertion of (iii) follows similarly. Now
suppose ϕ ≈F ϕ′ and ψ ≈F ψ′. Let x ∈ VP r varP (ψ′) and y ∈ VP r varP (ϕ).
By axiom (xii), ϕ < ψ = (ϕ < y)[y := ψ] ≈F (ϕ < y)[y := ψ′] = ϕ < ψ′ =
(x < ψ′)[x := ϕ] ≈F (x < ψ
′)[x := ϕ′] = ϕ′ < ψ′. Transitivity of ≈F yields
ϕ < ψ ≈F ϕ
′ < ψ′.
(iv) follows in a similar way as (iii).
(v) follows from axiom (xi) and symmetry of ≈F . 
Theorem 4.8 Every Henkin set has a model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D) be a Henkin set. We consider the equivalence rela-
tions ≈F and ≈T w.r.t. to the maximally consistent set Φ. Let ϕ be the equiva-
lence class of ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) modulo ≈F , and let s be the equivalence class of
s ∈ Tm(C) modulo ≈s.
Claim 1: For every t ∈ Tm(C) there is a c ∈ C such that c ≈T t. For every
ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) there is a d ∈ D such that d ≈F ϕ.
Proof of the Claim: If u ∈ VJ r var(t), then obviously Φ ⊢ (u ≡ t)[u := t]. By
axiom (xiii), Φ ⊢ ∨u.(u ≡ t). That is, Φ ⊢ ¬∧u.¬(u ≡ t). Since Φ is consis-
tent, Φ 0
∧
u.¬(u ≡ t). Since Φ is a Henkin set, Φ 0 ¬(c ≡ t) for some c ∈ C .
By maximally consistency of Φ, Φ ⊢ c ≡ t. Similarly for the second assertion.
This proves Claim 1.
The ingredients of our model are now given as follows:
M := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D)} = {d | d ∈ D}
TRUE := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ} = {ϕ | ϕ : true ∈ Φ}
FALSE := {ϕ | ϕ /∈ Φ} = {ϕ | ϕ : false ∈ Φ} = {ϕ | ¬ϕ ∈ Φ}
NECESSARY := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}
REASONs := {ϕ | ϕ : s ∈ Φ and s ∈ Tm(C)}
<M:= {(ϕ,ψ) | ϕ < ψ ∈ Φ}
L := {s | s ∈ Tm(C)} = {c | c ∈ C}
s+Λ t := s+ t
s ·Λ t := s · t
≤Λ:= {(s, t) | s ≤ t ∈ Φ}
Λ := (L,+Λ, ·Λ,≤Λ)
It will be helpful to have in mind that equivalence classes ϕ, s can be represented
by d, c, for some d ∈ D, c ∈ C , respectively. By Lemma 4.7, all the above sets
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and operations are well-defined.
Claim 2: NECESSARY =
⋃
s∈LREASONs, and the map s 7→ REASONs
is an order-isomorphism from (L,≤Λ) to ((REASONs)s∈Tm(C),⊆).
Proof of the Claim: If ϕ ∈ ⋃s∈LREASONs, then Φ ⊢ ϕ : c for some c ∈ C .
Choose u ∈ VJ r fvar(ϕ). Then Φ ⊢ (ϕ : u)[u := c]. By axiom (xiii), Φ ⊢∨
u.(ϕ : u). Axiom (vi) yields Φ ⊢ ϕ, thus ϕ ∈ NECESSARY . Now let
ϕ ∈ NECESSARY , that is, Φ ⊢ ϕ. By axiom (vi), Φ ⊢ ¬∧u.¬(ϕ : u),
where u ∈ VJ r fvarJ(ϕ). Suppose ϕ /∈
⋃
c∈C REASONc. Then Φ 0 ϕ : c
for all c ∈ C . Since Φ is a Henkin set, it follows that Φ ⊢
∧
u.¬(ϕ : u). This
contradiction shows that ϕ ∈
⋃
c∈C REASONc. From the axioms (xxi) and (xviii)
and the fact that Φ is a Henkin set it easily follows that
s ≤Λ t⇔ REASONs ⊆ REASONt.
It remains to show that the map s 7→ REASONs is injective. Suppose s 6= t,
i.e. Φ ⊢ ¬(s ≡ t). Then Φ ⊢ ¬∀x.(x : s ↔ x : t). Since Φ is a Henkin set,
there is a propositional constant d ∈ D such that Φ ⊢ ¬(d : s ↔ d : t). That is,
either (Φ ⊢ d : s and Φ 0 d : t) or (Φ 0 d : s and Φ ⊢ d : t). It follows that
either d ∈ REASONs r REASONt or d ∈ REASONt r REASONs. Thus,
REASONs 6= REASONt. This finishes the proof of the Claim.
For an assignment γ : V → M ∪ L let τγ : V → Fm(C,D) ∪ Tm(C) be a
function with the property τγ(x) ∈ γ(x), for every x ∈ VP ∪ VJ . Notice that
τγ : VP ∪ VJ → M ∪ L is both a substitution and an assignment. As the last
ingredient of our model we define the Gamma-function by
Γ (ϕ, γ) := d, where d is a propositional constant satisfying d ≈F ϕ[τγ ]
Γ (s, γ) := c, where c is a justification constant satisfying c ≈T s[τγ ].
It follows immediately that Γ (ϕ, γ) = ϕ[τγ ] and Γ (s, γ) = s[τγ ].
Claim 3: The Gamma-function satisfies the structure conditions of a model.
Proof of the Claim: (HP) and (EP) follow immediately. In order to show (CP) let
ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D), s ∈ Tm(C), and γ and γ′ be assignments with γ(x) = γ′(x) for
all x ∈ fvar(ϕ), and γ(u) = γ′(u) for all u ∈ var(s). Then τγ(x) ≈F τγ′(x) for
all x ∈ fvarP (ϕ), τγ(v) ≈T τγ′(v) for all v ∈ fvarJ(ϕ), and τγ(u) ≈T τγ′(u)
for all u ∈ var(s). That is, Φ ⊢ τγ ≡ϕ τγ′ and Φ ⊢ τγ ≡s τγ′ . By the axioms
(xii) and (xxii), Γ (ϕ, γ) = ϕ[τγ ] = ϕ[τ ′γ ] = Γ (ϕ, γ′) and Γ (s, γ) = s[τγ ] =
s[τγ ] = Γ (s, γ
′). Now we aim for (SP). Let σ : V → Fm(C,D) ∪ Tm(C) be
a substitution, ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) and s ∈ Tm(C). We must show: Γ (ϕ[σ], γ) =
ϕ[σ][τγ ] = ϕ[τγσ ] = Γ (ϕ, γσ) and Γ (s[σ], γ) = s[σ][τγ ] = s[τγσ] = Γ (s, γσ),
for all assignments γ : V → M ∪ L. By Lemma 2.3, ϕ[σ][τγ ] = ϕ[σ ◦ τγ ] and
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s[σ][τγ ] = s[σ ◦ τγ ]. Thus, it is enough to show that
ϕ[σ ◦ τγ ] ≈F ϕ[τγσ ] and
s[σ ◦ τγ ] ≈T s[τγσ].
Let x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Then on the one hand (σ ◦ τγ)(x) = σ(x)[τγ ]. And on the
other hand, τγσ(x) ∈ γσ(x) = Γ (σ(x), γ) = σ(x)[τγ ]. Hence, Φ ⊢ (σ ◦ τγ)(x) ≡
τγσ(x), for each x ∈ fvar(ϕ). Axiom (xii) yields the first assertion. The second
assertion follows analogously using axiom (xii). Thus, (SP) holds. Let ϕ,ψ be
formulas such that ϕ ≺ ψ. By Lemma 2.6, ϕ[τγ ] ≺ ψ[τγ ], where γ is any assign-
ment. By axiom (viii), ϕ[τβ] < ψ[τβ ] ∈ Φ. Thus, Γ (ϕ, γ) = ϕ[τγ ] <M ψ[τγ ] =
Γ (ψ, γ), and (RP) holds.
Claim 4: The Gamma-function satisfies the truth conditions.
Proof of the Claim:
Γ (ϕ ≡ ψ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ (ϕ ≡ ψ)[τγ ] ∈ TRUE
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ≡ ψ[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ≈F ψ[τγ ]
⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ψ, γ).
Γ (ϕ < ψ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ ϕ[τγ ] < ψ[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] <
M ψ[τγ ]
⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) <M Γ (ψ, γ).
Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ NECESSARY
⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ NECESSARY.
Γ (ϕ : s, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ (ϕ : s)[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] : s[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ REASONs[τγ ]
⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s,γ).
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Γ (ϕ→ ψ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s,γ) and Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (t,γ)
⇔ ϕ[τγ ]→ ψ[τγ ] ∈ REASONs[τγ ] and ϕ[τγ ] ∈ REASONt[τγ ]
⇔ (ϕ[τγ ]→ ψ[τγ ]) : s[τγ ] ∈ Φ and ϕ[τγ ] : t[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇒ ψ[τγ ] : (s[τγ ] · t[τγ ]) ∈ Φ, by axiom (iii)
⇔ (ψ : s · t)[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔ (ψ : s · t)[τγ ] ∈ TRUE
⇔ Γ (ψ : s · t, γ) ∈ TRUE
⇔ Γ (ψ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s·t,γ).
Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s,γ) ∪REASONΓ (t,γ)
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ REASONs[τγ ] ∪REASONt[τγ ]
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] : s[τγ ] ∈ Φ or ϕ[τγ ] : t[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇒ ϕ[τγ ] : (s[τγ ] + t[τγ ]) ∈ Φ, by axioms (iv), (v)
⇔ (ϕ : s+ t)[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔ (ϕ : s+ t)[τγ ] ∈ TRUE
⇔ Γ (ϕ : s+ t), γ) ∈ TRUE
⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ REASONΓ (s+t,γ).
Γ (
∧
u.ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE
⇔ (
∧
u.ϕ)[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇔
∧
v.(ϕ[τγ [u := v]]) ∈ Φ
(∗)
⇔ ϕ[τγ [u := v]][v := c] ∈ Φ, for all c ∈ C, since Φ is a Henkin set
⇔ ϕ[τγ [u := c]] ∈ Φ, for all c ∈ C
(∗∗)
⇔ ϕ[τγcu ] ∈ Φ, for all c ∈ C
⇔ Γ (ϕ, γcu) ∈ TRUE, for all c ∈ L
It remains to show that the equivalences (*) and (**) hold.
(*): v is the variable forced by the substitution τγ w.r.t.
∧
u.ϕ. Thus, v /∈
fvarJ(ϕ[τγ ]). Then it is clear that the equivalence (*) holds.
(**): Let z ∈ fvar(ϕ). First, we suppose z 6= u. Then τγ [u := c](z) =
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τγ(z) ∈ γ(z) and τγcu(u) ∈ γ
c
u(u) = γ(u). Thus, τγ [u := c](z) ≈F τγcx(z)
if z ∈ fvarP (ϕ); and τγ [u := c](z) ≈T τγcx(z) if z ∈ fvarJ(ϕ). Now sup-
pose z = u. Then τγ [u := c](z) = c and τγcu(z) ∈ γ
c
u(z) = c. Again,
τγ [x := c](z) ≈T τγcx(z). By axiom (xii), ϕ[τγ [u := c]] ≈F ϕ[τγcu ]. Item (v)
of Lemma 4.7 yields the equivalence (**).
The condition concerning the propositional quantifier follows analogously. Fi-
nally,
Γ (s ≤ t, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ s[τγ ] ≤ t[τγ ] ∈ Φ⇔ Γ (s, γ) ≤
Λ Γ (t, γ).
The remaining truth conditions follow easily from axioms of propositional logic.
Consider now the specific assignment β : V →M ∪ L defined by
β(x) := x
for each x ∈ VP ∪ VJ .
Claim 5: ϕ[τβ ] ≈F ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D).
Proof of the Claim: From the definition of the assignment/substitution τβ it follows
that Φ ⊢ τβ(x) ≡ ε(x) for all x ∈ fvar(ϕ), where ε is the identity substitution.
The Claim now follows from axiom (xii).
We have shown that
M := (Λ,M, TRUE,NECESSARY, (REASONl)l∈L, FALSE,<
M, Γ )
is a model. It follows now from Claim 5 and item (v) of Lemma 4.7 that the
interpretation (M, β) is a model of the Henkin set Φ:
(M, β)  ϕ⇔ Γ (ϕ, β) = ϕ[τβ] ∈ TRUE ⇔ ϕ[τβ ] ∈ Φ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φ.
Theorem 4.9 Every consistent set has a model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D) be consistent. We show that Φ extends to a Henkin
set Φ∗ in an appropriate extended language Fm(C∗,D∗). By Theorem 4.8, Φ∗ has
a model. We will see that its reduct to the sublanguage Fm(C,D) is a model of
Φ.
Let C0 := C , D0 := D, Φ0 := Φ. If Cn, Dn and Φn ⊆ Fm(Cn,Dn) are already
defined, then define
Cn+1 := Cn ∪ {cϕ,u | ϕ ∈ Fm(Cn,Dn), u ∈ fvarJ(ϕ)}
Dn+1 := Dn ∪ {dϕ,d | ϕ ∈ Fm(Cn,Dn), d ∈ fvarP (ϕ)}
Φn+1 := Φn ∪X(Cn,Dn) ∪ Y (Cn,Dn)
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according to the notation of Definition 4.4. By Lemma 4.5, Φn ∪ X(Cn,Dn) ⊆
Fm(Cn+1,Dn) and (Φn ∪ X(Cn,Dn)) ∪ Y (Cn,Dn) ⊆ Fm(Cn+1,Dn+1) are
consistent. That is, Φn+1 is consistent in Fm(Cn+1,Dn+1). Finally, we put
Φ+ :=
⋃
n<ω Φn. It follows that Φ+ ⊆ Fm(C∗,D∗), where C∗ =
⋃
n<ω Cn,
D∗ =
⋃
n<ωDn. Since derivation is finitary, Φ+ is consistent in the language
Fm(C∗,D∗). By a standard argument that uses Zorn’s Lemma, Φ+ extends to a
maximally consistent set Φ∗ ⊆ Fm(C∗,D∗).
If Φ∗ ⊢
∧
u.ϕ, then by axiom (xiv), Φ∗ ⊢ ϕ[u := c], for all c ∈ C∗. The other
way around, suppose Φ∗ ⊢ ϕ[u := c] for all c ∈ C∗, where u ∈ fvarJ(ϕ).
Let n,m be minimal with the property ϕ ∈ Fm(Cn,Dm). If n ≥ m, then
ϕ ∈ Fm(Cn,Dn), ϕ[u := cϕ,u] ∈ Fm(Cn+1,Dn) and cϕ,u ∈ Cn+1 r Cn.
By construction, ¬(ϕu) ∈ X(Cn,Dn) ⊆ Φn+1 ⊆ Φ∗. Thus, Φ∗ ⊢ ¬(ϕu).
If n < m, then ϕ ∈ Fm(Cm,Dm), ϕ[u := cϕ,u] ∈ Fm(Cm+1,Dm) and
cϕ,u ∈ Cm+1 r Cm. Again, it follows that Φ∗ ⊢ ¬(ϕu). Towards a contradic-
tion suppose Φ∗ 0
∧
u.ϕ. Since Φ∗ is maximally consistent, Φ∗ ⊢ ¬
∧
u.ϕ. Since
Φ∗ ⊢ ϕ[u := c] for all c ∈ C∗, we have in particular Φ∗ ⊢ ϕ[u := cϕ,u]. Thus,
Φ∗ ⊢ ¬
∧
u.ϕ ∧ ϕ[u := cϕ,u]. That is, Φ∗ ⊢ ϕu. This is a contradiction to
Φ∗ ⊢ ¬(ϕu) and the consistency of Φ∗. Therefore, Φ∗ ⊢
∧
u.ϕ. We have shown
that Φ∗ has the properties of a Henkin set.
Let (M∗, β) be a model of Φ∗ w.r.t. the language Fm(C∗,D∗), and let Γ ∗
be the Gamma-function of M∗. Let Γ be the restriction of Γ ∗ to the domain
Fm(C,D) ⊆ Fm(C∗,D∗). If we replace Γ ∗ with Γ in M∗, then obviously
we get a model M such that (M, β)  ϕ ⇔ (M∗, β)  ϕ for all formulas
ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D). The model M is called the reduct of M∗ to the sublanguage
Fm(C,D). In particular, (M, β)  Φ. 
Theorem 4.10 (Completeness Theorem) For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(C,D):
Φ  ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. The direction from right to left follows from the fact that all axioms are
valid and that the rule of Modus Ponens is sound. Let Φ  ϕ. Suppose Φ 0 ϕ.
From axioms of classical propositional logic it follows that Φ∪{¬ϕ} is consistent.
By the preceding results, this set has a model. This is a contradiction to Φ  ϕ. 
5 Capturing the modal logics S4 and S5
In this last section we discuss some extensions of our original deductive system.
In particular, we will show that adding the following axiom schema (4) and the
rule of Axiom Necessitation (see below) results in a system that is able to restore
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modal logic S4. The condition that formulas of the form (4) are theorems seems to
be essential for capturing modal logics by our semantics. We are unable to restore
weaker modal logics such as T or K not containing (4). Axiom schema (4) is given
by all formulas of the form
ϕ→ ϕ
In standard modal logic this schema stands for S4. We denote the system that we
get by adding (4) to our system Ax (together with Modus Ponens) by Ax+(4). Let
⊢(4) be the resulting relation of derivability. The new axiom schema corresponds
to the following new truth condition (4) of a model M:
Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇒ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE,
for all ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) and for all assignments γ : V → M . Let (4) be the
consequence relation of the logic generated by all models that satisfy the additional
truth condition (4).
Corollary 5.1 For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(C,D):
Φ (4) ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢(4) ϕ.
Proof. One easily checks that ϕ → ϕ is valid in all models with truth
condition (4). Towards completeness we follow exactly the same strategy as above.
It is sufficient to show that the model of Φ constructed in Theorem 4.8 (where Φ is
now a Henkin set w.r.t. the system Ax+ (4)) satisifies the new truth condition (4):
Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ TRUE
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ Φ
⇒ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ Φ, by the new axiom ϕ→ ϕ
⇔ ϕ[τγ ] ∈ TRUE
⇔ Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ TRUE.

Recall that the following axiom schema (E) stands for the modal logic S5:
♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ. Adding all formulas of this form as axioms to our system Ax results
in a system that we denote by Ax + (E). Axiom schema (E) corresponds to the
following new truth condition (E) of a model M:
Γ (ϕ, γ) ∈ POSSIBLE ⇒ Γ (♦ϕ, γ) ∈ NECESSARY,
for all ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) and for all assignments γ : V → M . Let ⊢(E) be the
derivability relation of system Ax+(E), and let (E) be the consequence relation
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of the logic generated by all models that satisfy the truth condition (E). Then in a
similar way as above one proves
Corollary 5.2 For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(C,D):
Φ (E) ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢(E) ϕ.
Axiom K of modal logic, (ϕ → ψ) → (ϕ → ψ), is not an axiom of
our systems but it is a valid (i.e., true in all models) and therefore derivable from
Ax, i.e. a theorem. This is shown in detail in the proof of Theorem 5.8 below.
A further essential ingredient of current modal logics is the rule of Necessitation:
from ϕ deriveϕ. In the following, we will show that the Necessitation rule can be
restored by introducing a rule of Axiom Necessitation together with axiom schema
(4).
Definition 5.3 Let Φ ⊆ Fm(C,D). Φ⊢
(AxNec)
(4) is the smallest set containing
Ax ∪ Φ+ (4) and being closed under Modus Ponens and under the rule of Axiom
Necessitation: If χ ∈ Ax + (4), then χ ∈ Φ⊢
(AxNec)
(4)
. Instead of ϕ ∈ Φ⊢
(AxNec)
(4)
we write Φ ⊢(AxNec)(4) ϕ.
The semantic counterpart is given by the class of all models with truth condition
(4) and the following truth condition (AxNec):
If χ ∈ Ax+ (4), then Γ (χ, γ) ∈ TRUE, for all assignments γ : V →M .
Truth condition (AxNec) guarantees the soundness of the rule of Axiom Ne-
cessitation (AxNec). On the other hand, following the proof of Theorem 4.8, one
recognizes that the model constructed there satisfies truth condition (AxNec), given
that the rule of Axiom Necessitation is part of the deductive system. Let (AxNec)(4)
be the consequence relation of the logic generated by the class of all models satis-
fying truth conditions (4) and (AxNec).
Corollary 5.4 For all Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm(C,D):
Φ 
(AxNec)
(4) ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢
(AxNec)
(4) ϕ.
In the same way, we define ⊢(AxNec)(E) and 
(AxNec)
(E) , and obtain a correspond-
ing completeness result. We denote the respective deductive systems by Ax +
(AxNec) + (4) and Ax+ (AxNec) + (E).
The system Ax+(AxNec)+(4) involves the following fundamental principle
of modal logic.
Theorem 5.5 (Necessitation) For every ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D):
⊢
(AxNec)
(4) ϕ =⇒ ⊢
(AxNec)
(4) ϕ.
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Proof. Suppose ⊢(AxNec)(4) ϕ. We show the assertion by induction on the length
n of the derivation of ϕ. If n = 1, then ϕ is an axiom or ϕ is derived by the rule
(AxNex). In the former case, (AxNec) yields ⊢(AxNec)(4) ϕ. In the latter case,
ϕ = ψ for some axiom ψ. By axiom (4), ψ → ψ. Modus Ponens yields
⊢
(AxNec)
(4) ψ, that is, ⊢
(AxNec)
(4) ϕ.
Now suppose there are formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ, derived in at most n ≥ 1 steps,
and ϕ is obtained by Modus Ponens. By induction hypothesis, ψ and (ψ → ϕ)
are derivable from the empty set. The formula(ψ → ϕ)→ (ψ → ϕ) is a the-
orem (see the proof of Theorem 5.8 below). Modus Ponens yields ⊢(AxNec)(4) ϕ. 
The last result implies that adding axiom (4) and the rule of Axiom Necessita-
tion to our original system we can derive in particular all theorems of modal logic
S4. Recall that axiom schema (4) is derivable in modal logic S5 (in fact, S4 is con-
tained in S5). Thus, from the proof of Theorem 5.5 it follows that we are also able
to capture modal logic S5. Taking into account our soundness and completeness
results we conclude the following.
Corollary 5.6 Let L ⊆ Fm(C,D) be the language of propositional modal logic
with the set of propositional variables VP . Then for all ϕ ∈ L,
ϕ is a theorem of S4 ⇐⇒ ⊢(AxNec)(4) ϕ⇐⇒ 
(AxNec)
(4) ϕ
ϕ is a theorem of S5 ⇐⇒ ⊢(AxNec)(E) ϕ⇐⇒ 
(AxNec)
(E) ϕ
In the rest of this section we present an alternative, purely model-theoretic
proof of this fact restricting our attention to modal logic S4. More precisely, we
are going to construct for each model of modal logic S4 an interpretation (M, β)
of our non-Fregean logic with truth conditions (4) and (AxNec) satisfying the same
set of formulas of the language L of modal logic, and vice-versa. This will give us
some interesting insights into the connection between the non-Fregean semantics
of our ∈J -Logic and the possible worlds semantics of modal logic S4. As above,
let L be the language of propositional modal logic, where VP = {x0, x1, ...} is the
set of propositional variables. Recall that a frame of modal logic S4 is a structure
F = (W,R), where W is a set of worlds and R ⊆ W × W is a reflexive and
transitive accessible relation on W . A truth value assignment of a frame F =
(W,R) is a function g : W → (VP → {0, 1}), w 7→ gw ∈ 2VP . The satisfaction
relation (w, g)  ϕ is inductively defined as follows: (w, g)  x :⇔ gw(x) = 1,
(w, g)  ¬ϕ :⇔ (w, g) 1 ϕ, (w, g)  ϕ → ψ :⇔ (w, g) 1 ϕ or (w, g)  ψ,
(w, g)  ϕ :⇔ (w′, g)  ϕ for all w′ ∈W with wRw′.
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Theorem 5.7 Let w be a world of a given frame F = (W,R) of modal logic S4,
and let g : W → (VP → {0, 1}) be a truth value assignment. There exists a
model M with the additional truth conditions (4) and (AxNec), and an assignment
β : VP →M such that for all ϕ ∈ L:
(M, β)  ϕ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ.
Proof. Let t, f, nec, imp be (names of) propositions, where t stands for true, f
stands for false, nec stands for necessary, and imp stands for impossible. Put
TRUE := {t, nec}, FALSE := {f, imp} and NECESSARY := {nec}.
The propositional universe of our model is M := TRUE ∪ FALSE and the
reference relation is given by <M:= M ×M . Furthermore, we define L := {l},
l ≤Λ l, l +Λ l := l, l ·Λ l := l, and REASONl := {nec}, where l is any new
symbol that will serve as a name for the (unique) justification {nec}. We define
the Gamma-function inductively on the construction of formulas, simultaneously
for all assignments γ : V →M :
Γ (x, γ) := γ(x), for x ∈ VP ∪ VJ
Γ (c) := l, for c ∈ C
Γ (d) := t, for d ∈ D (this assignment is arbitrary)
Γ (ϕ : true, γ) := Γ (ϕ, γ)
Γ (ϕ : false, γ) := Γ (¬ϕ, γ) :=


t, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = f
f, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = t
nec, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = imp
imp, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = nec
Γ (ϕ→ ψ, γ) :=


t, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = f or Γ (ψ, γ) = t
f, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = t and Γ (ϕ, γ) = f
nec, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = imp or Γ (ψ, γ) = nec
imp, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = nec and Γ (ψ, γ) = imp
Γ (ϕ ≡ ψ, γ) :=
{
t, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = Γ (ψ, γ)
f, else
Γ (ϕ < ψ, γ) := Γ (s ≤ t, γ) := t
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Γ (ϕ, γ) := Γ (ϕ : s, γ) :=
{
nec, if Γ (ϕ, γ) = nec or ϕ ∈ Ax+ (4)
f, else
Γ (
∧
u.ϕ, γ) :=
{
t, if Γ (ϕ, γlu) ∈ TRUE
f, else
Γ (∀x.ϕ, γ) :=
{
t, if Γ (ϕ, γmx ) ∈ TRUE for all m ∈M
f, else
It is crucial that the axiomϕ→ ϕ holds in the given model w. Otherwise,
we were not able to define the Gamma-function in any reasonable way for the case
Γ (ϕ, γ). One easily checks that
M = (Λ,M, TRUE,NECESSARY,REASONl, FALSE,<
M, Γ )
satisfies all properties of a model. The structure conditions (CP) and (SP) follow by
induction. Only the proof of the quantifier case of (SP) is somewhat complicated:
suppose ϕ = ∀x.ψ, and let σ : V →M ∪ L be a substitution.
Claim: For all m ∈M and all y ∈ fvar(ψ):
(5.1) (γσ)mx (y) = (γmz σ[x := z])(y),
where z is the variable forced by σ w.r.t. ϕ. That is, ϕ[σ] = (∀x.ψ)[σ] =
∀z.(ψ[σ[x := z]). Let y ∈ fvar(ψ). First, suppose y = x. Then (γσ)mx (y) = m.
On the other hand, (γmz σ[x := z])(y) = Γ (σ[x := z](y), γmz ) = Γ (z, γmz ) =
γmz (z) = m. Now suppose that y 6= x. Note that by definition, z /∈ fvar(σ(y)).
Then by (CP) we get (γσ)mx (y) = (γσ)(y) = Γ (σ(y), γ) = Γ (σ(y), γmz ) =
Γ (σ[x := z](y), γmz ) = (γ
m
z σ[x := z])(y). This proves the Claim.
Consequently:
Γ (∀x.ψ, γσ) = t⇔ Γ (ψ, (γσ)mx ) = t, for all m ∈M
⇔ Γ (ψ, γmz σ[x := z]) = t, for all m ∈M, by (5.1) and (CP)
⇔ Γ (ψ[σ[x := z]], γmz ) = t, by induction hypothesis
⇔ Γ (∀z.ψ[σ[x := z]], γmz ) = t
⇔ Γ ((∀x.ψ)[σ], γ) = t
Since there are only the two possible truth values t or f for a quantified formula, it
follows that Γ (ϕ[σ], γ) = Γ (ϕ, γσ). The case ϕ =
∧
u.ψ follows similarly. Thus,
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(SP) holds. The remaining structure properties of a model are trivially satisfied.
The truth conditions follow readily from the construction. From the definition of
the Gamma-function in the case Γ (ϕ, γ) it follows that the model also satisfies
the truth conditions (4) and (AxNec).
Now we define the assignment β : VP ∪ VJ →M ∪ L by
β(x) :=


t, if (w, g)  x and (w, g) 1 x
f, if (w, g) 1 x and (w, g) 1 ¬x
nec, if (w, g)  x
imp, if (w, g)  ¬x
Then one shows by induction on ϕ ∈ L that the following holds:
Γ (ϕ, β) = t⇔ (w, g)  ϕ and (w, g) 1 ϕ
Γ (ϕ, β) = f ⇔ (w, g) 1 ϕ and (w, g) 1 ¬ϕ
Γ (ϕ, β) = nec⇔ (w, g)  ϕ
Γ (ϕ, β) = imp⇔ (w, g)  ¬ϕ
This implies
(M, β)  ϕ⇔ Γ (ϕ, β) ∈ TRUE ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ,
for every ϕ ∈ L. 
It might be an interesting observation that the model constructed in the proof
of Theorem 5.7 is in some sense a 4-valued model of a logic that extends the modal
system S4.
Now we prove the converse of Theorem 5.7. As above, we suppose that L
is the language of propositional modal logic with VP = {x0, x1, ...} the set of
propositional variables.
Theorem 5.8 LetM be a model satisfying the additional truth conditions (AxNec)
and (4). Let β : VP → M be an assignment. Then there exists a frame (W,R) of
modal logic S4, a truth value assignment g : W → (VP → {0, 1}), and a world
w ∈W such that for all ϕ ∈ L:
(M, β)  ϕ⇔ (w, g)  ϕ.
Proof. We will use some basic concepts of the theory of abstract logics (see, e.g.,
[15, 13]). A classical abstract logic A = (Expr, Th, {֌,∼ .g,uprise}) is given by
a set of expressions or formulas Expr, a subset Th of the powerset of Expr such
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that for every non-empty T ⊆ Th,
⋂
T ∈ Th, and a set of connectives {g,uprise,֌
,∼}. The elements of Th are called theories. Every theory is the intersection
of a non-empty set of maximal theories (maximal w.r.t. set-theoretic inclusion).
The connectives satisfy the following properties. For all expressions a, b and all
maximal theories T : a → b ∈ T ⇔ a /∈ T or b ∈ T , ∼ a ∈ T ⇔ a /∈ T ,
a g b ∈ T ⇔ a ∈ T or b ∈ T , a uprise b ∈ T ⇔ a ∈ T and b ∈ T . Note
that Th ∪ {Expr} is a closure system. The corresponding closure operator is
the consequence relation of logic A which is required to be compact. A set B
of expressions is said to be consistent in A if B is contained in some theory. It
follows that a set T of expressions is a theory iff T is consistent and closed under
the consequence relation. Note that Expr is not a theory.
Obviously, the class of all models of ∈J -Logic generates a classical abstract
logic A. In fact, the set of formulas satisfied by a model is a maximal theory. The
compactness of the consequence relation follows from our completeness theorem.
The set of formulas FM := {ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) | Γ (ϕ, β) ∈ TRUE} = {ϕ ∈
Fm(C,D) | (M, β)  ϕ} is a maximal theory, and FN := {ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) |
Γ (ϕ, β) ∈ NECESSARY } ⊆ FM is therefore a consistent set in the sense of
the abstract logic A.
Claim 1: FN is a theory in the sense of the classical abstract logic A, i.e. FN is
the intersection of a non-empty set of maximal theories.
Proof of the Claim: Since a set B is a theory iff B is consistent and deductively
closed, it remains to show that FN is deductively closed, i.e. FN  ϕ implies
ϕ ∈ FN . Recall that  coincides with the closure operator of the closure system
associated with the classical abstract logic A. By our completeness theorem, it is
enough to prove: FN ⊢ ϕ implies ϕ ∈ FN . We show this by induction on the
length of a derivation. If this length is 1, then ϕ ∈ FN or ϕ is an axiom. We may
assume that ϕ is an axiom. Truth condition (AxNec) implies ϕ ∈ FN . If the length
of the derivation is greater than 1, then there are formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ such that
NF ⊢ ψ and NF ⊢ ψ → ϕ. By induction hypothesis, ψ,ψ → ϕ ∈ FN . That
is, Γ (ψ, β) ∈ NECESSARY and Γ (ψ → ϕ, β) ∈ NECESSARY . There are
indexes l, k such that Γ (ψ → ϕ, β) ∈ REASONk and Γ (ψ, β) ∈ REASONl.
Let u, v ∈ VJ r (fvarJ(ϕ) ∪ fvarJ(ψ)), and let β′ be an assignment that co-
incides with β on fvar(ϕ) ∪ fvar(ψ), and β′(u) = k and β′(v) = l. Then
by (CP), Γ (ψ → ϕ, β′) = Γ (ψ → ϕ, β) ∈ REASONΓ (u,β′) = REASONk
and Γ (ψ, β′) = Γ (ψ, β) ∈ REASONΓ (v,β′) = REASONl. By truth con-
dition (xi) and (HP) of a model, Γ (ϕ, β) = Γ (ϕ, β′) ∈ REASONΓ (u·v,β′) =
REASONΓ (u,β′)·ΛΓ (v,β′) = REASONk·Λl ⊆ NECESSARY . Then ϕ ∈ FN
and FN is deductively closed. This proves the Claim.11
11Notice that we have in particular proved that FN is closed under Modus Ponens. This imme-
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Since FN is a theory, there are maximal theories (Ti)i∈I , Ti ⊆ Fm(C,D),
such that FN =
⋂
i∈I Ti. Observe that (M, β)  ϕ ⇔ ϕ ∈ FN ⇔ ϕ ∈ Ti for
all i ∈ I . For each i ∈ I we define an extensional model Mi as follows. Let t, f, l
be new symbols. We define Mi := {t, f}, Li := {l}, REASON il := TRUEi :=
{t}, FALSEi := {f}, NECESSARYi := TRUEi, <i:= Mi × Mi. The
symbols + and · are again interpreted as the trivial, idempotent operations on Li.
The Gamma-function is defined simultaneously for all assignments γ : VP ∪VJ →
Mi ∪ Li as follows:
Γi(x, γ) := γ(x), for x ∈ VP ∪ VJ
Γi(c) := l, for c ∈ C
Γi(d) := t, for d ∈ D
Γi(ϕ : true, γ) := Γi(ϕ, γ) := Γi(ϕ : s, γ) := Γi(ϕ, γ)
Γi(ϕ : false, γ) := Γi(¬ϕ, γ) :=
{
t, if Γi(ϕ, γ) = f
f, if Γi(ϕ, γ) = t
Γi(ϕ→ ψ, γ) :=
{
t, if Γi(ϕ, γ) = f or Γi(ψ, γ) = t
f, if Γi(ϕ, γ) = t and Γi(ϕ, γ) = f
Γi(ϕ ≡ ψ, γ) :=
{
t, if Γi(ϕ, γ) = Γi(ψ, γ)
f, else
Γi(ϕ < ψ, γ) := Γi(s ≤ t, γ) := t
Γi(
∧
u.ϕ, γ) :=
{
t, if Γi(ϕ, γlu) ∈ TRUE
f, else
Γi(∀x.ϕ, γ) :=
{
t, if Γi(ϕ, γmx ) ∈ TRUE for all m ∈M
f, else
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 5.7 one shows thatMi satisfies all proper-
ties of a model. We now consider the specific assignments ̺i : VP ∪VJ →Mi∪Li
defined as follows:
diately implies that axiom K, (ψ → ϕ) → (ψ → ϕ), is valid and therefore a theorem in
∈J -Logic. We have already used this fact before.
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̺i(x) :=


t, if x ∈ Ti for x ∈ VP
f, if x /∈ Ti for x ∈ VP
l, if x ∈ VJ
We put T ′i := Th((Mi, ̺i)) := {ϕ ∈ Fm(C,D) | (Mi, ̺i)  ϕ}. Note that
the T ′i have the following property: ϕ ∈ T ′i ⇔ ϕ ∈ T ′i . This will be crucial for
our construction.
Claim 2: L ∩ FN = L ∩
⋂
i∈I T
′
i .
Proof of the Claim: By induction on ϕ ∈ L one shows: L ∩ Ti ⊆ L ∩ T ′i , for
every i ∈ I . It follows that L ∩ FN = L ∩
⋂
i∈I Ti ⊆ L ∩
⋂
i∈I T
′
i . We now
show L ∩
⋂
i∈I T
′
i ⊆ L ∩
⋂
i∈I Ti by induction on the formulas of L. The only
interesting case in the induction step is ψ ∈ L ∩
⋂
i∈I T
′
i . Assuming this it fol-
lows that ψ ∈ L ∩
⋂
i∈I T
′
i , and by induction hypothesis, ψ ∈ L ∩
⋂
i∈I Ti. Thus,
ψ ∈ L ∩ FN . That is, ψ ∈ FM . Since the model M satisfies the truth condi-
tion (4), i.e. all formulas of the form ϕ → ϕ, we get ψ ∈ FM , that is,
ψ ∈ FN . Thus, ψ ∈ L ∩
⋂
i∈I Ti. This proves the Claim.
We define worlds w∗ := L ∩ FM and wi := L ∩ T ′i , for i ∈ I (we suppose
that ∗ /∈ I). The frame (W,R) is given by W := {w∗} ∪ {wi | i ∈ I} and
R := {(w∗, wi) | i ∈ I} ∪ {(w∗, w∗)} ∪ {(wi, wi) | i ∈ I}. The truth value
assignment g : W → (VP → {0, 1}) is defined by gw(x) = 1 :⇔ x ∈ w, for
w ∈W .
Claim 3: For all ϕ ∈ L and for all w ∈W : (w, g)  ϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ w.
Proof of the Claim: The Claim can be proved by induction on ϕ ∈ L, simultane-
ously for all wi, i ∈ I , and then for w∗ ∈W . We show only the case ϕ = ψ. Let
i ∈ I . Then
(wi, g)  ψ ⇔ (wi, g)  ψ
⇔ ψ ∈ wi, by induction hypothesis
⇔ ψ ∈ L ∩ T ′i
⇔ ψ ∈ L ∩ T ′i
⇔ ψ ∈ wi
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(w∗, g)  ψ ⇔ (w∗, g)  ψ and (wi, g)  ψ for all i ∈ I
⇔ ψ ∈ w∗ and ψ ∈ wi for all i ∈ I, by induction hypothesis
⇔ ψ ∈ L ∩ FM and ψ ∈ L ∩
⋂
i∈I
T ′i
⇔ ψ ∈ L ∩ FN , by Claim 2
⇔ ψ ∈ L ∩ FM = w∗.
It is clear that (W,R) is a frame of modal logic S4. It remains to prove the follow-
ing Claim 4: For all ϕ ∈ L:
(M, β)  ϕ⇔ (w∗, g)  ϕ.
Proof of the Claim: This is again an induction on ϕ ∈ L. We show the case
ϕ = ψ:
(M, β)  ψ ⇔ Γ (ψ, β) ∈ TRUE ⇔ ψ ∈ FM ⇔ (w∗, g)  ψ, by Claim
3. Thus, Claim 4 is true. This finishes the proof of the theorem. 
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